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THE GOOD FAITH PURCHASER AND THE
SUPERIOR EQUITIES DOCTRINE
Allstate Insurance Company v. Estes, 345 So. 2d 265 (Miss. 1977).
A new Chevrolet Sports Coupe was stolen from the lot of the Nim-
nicht Chevrolet Company of Jacksonville, Florida, in the early part of
1974. Thereafter Nimnicht Chevrolet called upon its insurer, Allstate
Insurance Company, which paid the loss of the cost and insured value
of the vehicle by delivering a check for $4,613.05 to Nimnicht
Chevrolet. On August 14, 1975, David L. Estes purchased this
automobile in Jackson, Mississippi, from James E. Howard.
Although Mr. Howard had no fixed place of business, he represented
himself to be an automobile salesman and had a Mississippi dealer's
license. Mr. Estes traded a 1970 Chevelle for the 1974 Sports Coupe
and borrowed $3,756.00 from Mississippi Bank and Trust Company
of Jackson to pay off the First American Bank of Memphis, Ten-
nessee, the lien holder of the Sports Coupe. Mr. Estes was furnished a
Tennessee certificate of title and after the Mississippi Bank and Trust
Company paid off the lien of the Memphis bank, the parties arranged
for a Mississippi certificate of title, which Mr. Estes also obtained.
Mr. Estes had no knowledge that the car he had purchased was stolen
until January 16, 1975, when the Mississippi Highway Safety Patrol
seized the vehicle and placed it in storage.
An investigation by the Mississippi Highway Patrol revealed that
the car had been titled in Mississippi as a result of a Tennessee title.
The automobile was titled in Tennessee due to an Alabama tag
receipt. Since at that time Alabama was not a title state, Tennessee
acknowledged the tag receipt as proof of ownership. Checking fur-
ther, the Highway Patrol found that the tag receipt was obtained with
a bill of sale which was a forgery from a car dealership in
Montgomery, Alabama. The Highway Patrol concluded that after
the car was stolen it was brought to Alabama, where the fraudulent
bill of sale was procured, thereby allowing the thief to purchase a tag
for the vehicle.
Immediately after the Mississippi Highway Patrol seized the
automobile and put it in storage, Mr. Estes filed an action requesting
an order directing that he be granted immediate possession of the car.
When Mr. and Mrs. Estes executed a personal bond in the amount of
$5,000.00, the automobile was restored to them. The court allowed
Allstate Insurance Company to file a petition to intervene upon
notification that the automobile has been repossessed. Allstate made
claim to the car since it had paid for the car, had valid title because of
such payment, and was entitled to possession and ownership of the
automobile.
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The case was tried twice in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial
District of Hinds County, the first trial ending in a mistrial when the
jury was unable to agree on a verdict. In the second trial the jury,
after considering the good faith equities as between Mr. Estes and
Allstate Insurance Company, returned a verdict in favor of Mr.
Estes. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the good
faith equities approach of the jury and instead predicated its decision
on the common law notion that a thief could not convey good title.
Therefore title to the automobile remained in the insurance company,
which obtained valid title by paying the Florida dealer's loss.
The supreme court examined the Mississippi Uniform Commercial
Code section 75-2-403, which provides: "A purchaser of goods ac-
quires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer.... A
person with voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good
faith purchaser for value."' The Mississippi Supreme Court deter-
mined that, irrespective of the number of transactions, this section
mandates that a purchaser can take only those rights which his
transferor has in the subject goods. Therefore a thief has neither title
nor power to convey title. As a result, title remained in Allstate In-
surance Company, and the circuit court order granting possession to
Mr. Estes was declared erroneous.
Under the common law a transferor could pass only such title as he
actually owned. A thief, therefore, could not pass good title under
any circumstances. A purchaser obtaining a transfer in this manner
was said to receive a void title. Thus the true owner could always
recover his property. In 1958 the Mississippi Supreme Court laid
down the following rule echoing the common law:
In pursuance of the general rule that a person cannot transfer a better
title to a chattel than he himself has, one who has acquired possession
of property by a crime such as theft cannot confer title by a sale even to
a bona fide purchaser. Even innocent parties can acquire no title or
lien from a tortious possessor.... The same defect of title will con-
tinue to exist in all subsequent sales by persons deriving title from a
thief as a source.
2
The severity of this common law principle with respect to innocent
purchasers who had paid their money in absolute good faith induced
some states such as New York to enact modifications of the common
law rule so that the title owner who conveyed voidable title would not
be empowered to rescind it against a bona fide purchaser for value.3
In short, the definition of what constituted a voidable title began to
'U.C.C. § 2-403.
2Gurley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 233 Miss. 58, 61, 101 So. 2d 101, 102 (1958), quoting
46 AM. JUR. Sales § 459.
'Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 168, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 400 (1967).
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undergo a gradual expansion, one which may not have yet terminated.
A void title is a nullity which cannot be confirmed or ratified, but
"a person who has voidable title to goods subject to being avoided by
his transferor, is able to transfer an indefeasible title to a good faith
purchaser for value."" "Reasoning that the rightful owner intended
to pass title, even though this intention was fraudulently induced, the
fraudulent buyer is said to get legal title and possession."' Innocence
would transform the defective title into a state of perfection.
The protected status of the good faith purchaser for value was fur-
ther extended in many courts to invest circumstances where the title
owner had not conveyed even a voidable title, "but had so clothed the
transferor with apparent vestiges of authority and indicia of title that
equitable principles of estoppel were invoked to preclude the title
owner from asserting his title." 6  This would cover such cir-
cumstances as "where the owner of an automobile or one having a
security interest therein, permits another to have the motor vehicle's
certificate of title, or any other document relied upon as evidencing ti-
tle, with the result that a purchaser or subsequent encumbrancer is, or
claims to be, misled as to the actual ownership of the vehicle." ' "The
owner of personalty, or one having an interest therein, may, by
clothing another with the apparent ownership or right of disposal, be
estopped to assert his rights as against an innocent purchaser for value
who, in dealing with the property, has relied upon such apparent
ownership or authority." '
U.C.C. section 2-403 continued to extend the rights of a third per-
son who has innocently bought property from a thief or from a person
who has been entrusted with possession, even if not authorized to
sell. 9 Under U.C.C. section 2-401(2) title ordinarily passes when
goods are delivered, unless otherwise explicitly agreed. Section 2-403
states that a voidable title is created when passage of title is made to
depend upon the performance of some condition subsequent. Such a
title can be transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value even if the
transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, the delivery
was in exchange for a check later dishonored, or the delivery was pro-
cured through a fraud and punishable as larcenous under the criminal
law.'" Therefore what was previously uncertain has been made
'3A R. DUSENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 10.02 (1978); [hereinafter cited as DUSENBERG & KING]; see
Sullivan v. Larson, 149 Neb. 97, 30 N.W. 2d 460 (1948) quoting, Rowley v. Bigelow, 29
Mass. (12 Pick.) 307 (1832).
IDUSENBERG AND KING § 10.02.
'54 Misc. 168, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 400, 403.
'Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 813, 816 (1951).
'Id. at 816.
'54 Misc. 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400.
1°U.C.C. § 2-403.
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precise by section 2-403." Subdivision two provides that the en-
trusting of goods to a person in the business of selling goods of that
kind can validate a transfer to a buyer in the ordinary course of
business; this is true, as is detailed in subdivision three, even if the pro-
curement of the entrustment was larcenous.'
2
This gradual national expansion of the voidable title concept is in-
dicative of the increased protection that society demands for the bona
fide purchaser. The innocent transferee has for all practicable pur-
poses attained a position where the courts can feel reasonably secure
in allocating risks between him and the true owner, especially where
neither party has been guilty of any culpable wrongdoing. 3 "The
U.C.C. represents substantial progress in the long journey toward the
attainment of a merchantile or commercial theory regarding goods,
documents, and instruments; and the inclusion of U.C.C. section
2-403 granting a measure of negotiability to goods in a commercial
setting has been the most dramatic step forward." ",
The dramatic step forward of U.C.C. § 2-403 represents a retreat from
the common law notion expressed in the maxim Nermo dat quot non
habet, that a person cannot give a better title to property than he
himself possesses. While U.C.C. § 2-403 arguably replaces that void
versus voidable title distinction and the doctrine of estoppel with more
workable tests, the section has been criticized as unclear and for not
going far enough.'I
Thus where a transferor has failed to comply with a condition
subsequent but nevertheless has conveyed the title to a bona fide pur-
chaser, the transferor under section 2-403(1) has conveyed a good ti-
tle. Section 2-403(2) similarly allows one who has been entrusted with
the owner's property to convey such property to a bona fide pur-
chaser, provided that the transferor has represented himself as a mer-
chant who deals in the property. In either instance the transferor has
been labeled a "thief" or "rogue" by various courts and commen-
tators.
Consequently the question arises whether U.C.C. section 2-403 ap-
"3 A. SQUILLANTE & J. FoNsus, WILLISTON ON SALES § 23-13 (4th ed. 1974)
(hereinafter cited as WILLISTON ON SALES).
1"U.C.C. § 2-403.
11R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS, & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW (2d ed.
1974) 1204 [hereinafter cited as SPEIDEL, SUMMERS, & WHITE]; see, e.g., Schrier v.
Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1971); Johnny Dell, Inc. v. New York State
Police, 84 Misc. 2d 360, 375 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1975); Barry Industries v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 302 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1973); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Pottmeyer, 176 Ohio St. 1,
197 N.E.2d 343 (1964).
"SPEIDEL, SUMMERS, & WHITE, supra note 13, at 1204.
, 'Id; see note, The Good Faith Purchaser of Goods and "Entrusting " to a Merchant
Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 2-403, 38 IND L. REV. 675 (1963); see also




plies to the thief who steals an automobile outright and subsequently
has the automobile transferred to a bona fide purchaser. If the
answer is no, as a number of courts have held," the question then
arises as to where must the court draw the line in recognizing a
voidable title in the possession of a "thief." Perhaps a more impor-
tant question is whether section 2-403 points the way for the court to
expand protection for the bona fide purchaser who receives title to
property that is stolen outright.
The extensive enactment of certificate of title legislation has made
the problem of applying U.C.C. section 2-403 to motor vehicles even
more arduous. The U.C.C. generally acknowledges transfer of title to
goods and does not prohibit specific state legislation controlling the
transfer of title." Most states have statutes providing for the issuance
of certificates of title or ownership to motor vehicles and these statutes
"have played a part in contests involving the classic dispute between
the rights of an owner and those of a good faith purchaser."'" Cer-
tificate of title laws have had a substantial impact because they have
required that at the time of a sale of a motor vehicle, a certificate must
be transferred to validate the transaction. "These vary from state to
state and the judicial interpretations of similar provisions are not
necessarily uniform." I
The legal history connected with certificate of titles to motor
vehicles is well known:
At the outset travel by automobile was slow, and the system of filing
and recording chattel mortgages on an automobile was simple and ef-
fective. [A]s time progressed.. .the automobile industry has become an
immense commercial enterprise. The opportunities for fraud are quite
obvious, for as a rule from the time it is first bought until it is junked
an automobile changes hands many times. To meet this situation and
to afford better protection to lien holders and innocent purchasers, a
majority of the States have certificate of title acts in some form.... The
legislatures of the states on the whole seem to be conscious that legisla-
tion of this kind is necessary to properly deal with the problems
resulting from the sale and resale of automobiles.20
Generally the certificate of title is similar to the Torrens system in that
the central recordation of encumbrances and changes of title appear
"See, e.g., Walker v. Johnson, 354 So. 2d 792 (Miss. 1978); Litchfield v. Dueitt,
245 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 1971); Schrier v. Home Indem. Co., 273 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1971);
Linwood Harvestore, Inc. v. Cannon, 427 Pa. 434, 235 A.2d 377 (1967).
"WILLISTON ON SALES, supra note 11, at § 23-11.
"DUSENBERG & KING, supra note 4, § 10.05; see Lusk, Effect of Registration and
Certificate of Title Acts on the Ownership of Motor Vehicles, 21 and IND. Bus. STUDIES
8 (1941).
"2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-401:9 (2d ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as 2 R. ANDERSON].
2 Bank of Atlanta v. Fretz, 148 Tex. 551, 226 S.W.2d 843, 847 (1950).
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on a single instrument." When an automobile is sold, the certificate
is given to the buyer, who sends it to a state agency which notes the
change in ownership and issues a new certificate to the buyer, resulting
in a complete record of changes in title. 2
Where the statute sets up a regular system of title registration, similar
to the Torrens system of registering realty titles, and stipulates an ex-
clusive procedure for the transfer of title and recordation of liens or
encumbrances on the title certificate, it is generally held that an inno-
cent purchaser for value, relying upon the possession of such a cer-
tificate showing no encumbrances will be protected against the claims
of a chattel mortgagee, conditional vendor, or other holder of a securi-
ty interest. 3
The effect of a motor vehicle certificate of title statute such as sec-
tion 63-21-9 of the Mississippi Code2' makes it impossible to validate
a transfer of title to a buyer if the title certificate is not transferred.
Although the U.C.C. does not displace such a statute under U.C.C.
section 1-103, the U.C.C. is pertinent authority for other questions
relating to the sale of a motor vehicle.
2 1
When a thief fraudulently procures a certificate of title and sells
the car to a bona fide purchaser for value, the question arises whether
the buyer receives a greater protection since he relied on the certificate
of title or whether he loses the car under U.C.C. section 2-401 or 2-403
to the true owner. If the thief has stolen the car outright, then he ap-
parently has failed to qualify under the voidable title-condition subse-
quent or entrustment provisions of U.C.C. section 2-403. Therefore
he must rely upon the certificate of title to win over the true owner.
His success may depend on whether the particular certificate of title
act preempts the Code.
"Under most statutes, the certificate of title is evidence of owner-
ship, of greater or less persuasiveness, so that an innocent purchaser
for value, taking possession in reliance upon a certificate apparently
valid, is in many instances protected."21 6 Section 63-21-9 requires all
vehicles to have a certificate of title. The contents of the certificate as
detailed in section 63-21-9 must include the date issued, name of the
party, address, and the names of the two prior lienholders, if any. The
certificate of title issued by the comptroller is prima facie evidence of
the facts appearing on it.
The transfer of title to automobiles is governed by the various
states' motor vehicle title transfer acts. Under the U.C.C. it is im-
I, The Impact of Automobile Certificate of Title Laws on Ownership and Encum-
brance, 36 MINN. L. REV. 77 (1951).
221d.
21Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 813 (1951).
'"MIss. CODE ANN. (1972).




material that no certificate of title has been transferred as may be re-
quired by local law; for the U.C.C. does not make the delivery of title
certificate an essential element in the transfer of title.' The U.C.C.
makes no distinction in the transfer of title between an automobile
and any other kind of goods. "[I]n the absence of a local statute
declaring the sale of an automobile void when a title certificate is not




Despite the fact that Mr. Estes' certificate of title was prima facie
evidence of his ownership of the automobile in the instant case, the
Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's holding that
Mr. Estes be vested with title, immediate ownership, possession, and
control of the vehicle, and held that since a thief cannot convey a good
title, title to the automobile remained with Allstate Insurance Com-
pany, which obtained valid title by paying the Florida dealer's loss.
However, on virtually the same set of facts a contrary result was
reached by another court in Schrier v. Home Indemnity Company.2'
In the Schrier case, a 1967 Cadillac sedan was stolen on June 14 of
that year from a car rental agency by some unknown person. Even-
tually it came into the hands of a Maryland dealer and was purchased
by Schrier in June 1967. It was delivered to him in Washington,
D.C., by a representative of the Maryland dealer who signed a bill of
sale and promised to procure a Maryland certificate of title for him.
The car at the time bore Maryland dealer tags. About a month later
the car was seized by the D. C. Metropolitan Police as stolen property.
Schrier regained possession of the vehicle from the police on a replevin
action and was granted certificate of title from the Department of
Motor Vehicles of the District of Columbia since it was held that he
had a right to the ownership to the car. Meanwhile Home Indemnity
had paid its insured the value of the automobile at the time of the
theft. The insurer then brought an action against the subsequent pur-
chaser to recover the automobile or its value.
Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized
that "a possessor of stolen goods, no matter how innocently acquired,
can never convey a good title," it held that the insurer's right to
recover would depend upon the finding by the trial court concerning
relative equities of the parties, taking into consideration whether the
insurer was dilatory to the actual prejudice of the purchaser in making
its claims or whether the purchaser acted so negligently in purchasing
the automobile without conclusive proof of title that its equities were
inferior to those of the insurer. 30 The court further found in Schrier
27/d.
2"Id.
"273 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1971).
"Id. at 250.
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that where "neither party is guilty of wrongdoing or culpable
negligence, the party invoking subrogation cannot recover unless its
equities are greater than those of its adversary." 
3 '
Subrogation is an equitable right which often supports the princi-
ple of indemnity, since the insurance company (Allstate Insurance
Company in the present case) upon paying the insured (Nimnicht
Chevrolet Company) steps into the insured's shoes and tries to assert
claims of that insured against some other person (David L. Estes) for
the loss for which it has paid. 32 No general rule can be established
which will provide a test for the application of subrogation in all
cases." Whether or not the remedy is applicable depends on the par-
ticular facts and circumstances of each case as it arises.3 ' However
"the doctrine as now applied is broad enough to include every in-
stance in which one person, not acting voluntarily, pays a debt or
discharges an obligation for which another is primarily liable, and
which in equity and in good conscience should have been discharged
by the latter .... "" "[Tlhe doctrine of subrogation.. .is a remedy
which is highly favored. The courts are inclined rather to extend than
to restrict the principle." 
36
Various maxims of equity have come into play when subrogation is
sought, such as he who comes into equity must do equity. To be en-
titled to legal subrogation a "person" must act fairly and equitably
and be free from fault." "[Clulpable negligence may prevent one
from being afforded the equitable relief of subrogation." 3 Subroga-
tion is also defeated by countervailing equities and will not be enforc-
ed to the prejudice of equal or higher rights of others."
This superior equity rule, as announced in the Schrier case, is
distinctly applicable to the facts in the instant case since it is un-
disputed that the party invoking subrogation, Allstate Insurance
Company, was not guilty of any wrongdoing or culpable negligence.
The loss suffered by Allstate Insurance Company was $4,613.05 as op-
posed to the loss to Mr. Estes of the automobile plus a debt to the
Mississippi Bank and Trust Company which totaled $4,617.00. The
general thrust of the U.C.C., its title provisions, and case law reveals
IIId. at 251. This same court reaffirmed the principle of superior equities in Barry
Indus. Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 302 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1975).
" SPEIDEL, SUMMERS, & WHITE, supra at 869.
"Hay v. Crawford, 159 Kan. 723, 158 P.2d 463, 468 (1945).
"Id.
" Nat'l Sur. Corp. v. Edwards House Col., 191 Miss. 884, 4 So. 2d 340, 341 (1941).
"Schmid v. First Camden Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 130 N. 1. Eq. 254, 22 A.2d 246,
253 (1941).
" Luikart v. Buck, 131 Neb. 866, 270 N.W. 495, 496 (1936).
"Castleman Constr. Co. v. Pennington, 22 Tenn. 82, 432 S.W.2d 669, 676 (1968).




that when the problem of achieving a fair risk allocation between the
true owner and bona fide purchaser occurs in the light of a
commercial transaction, the trend in the law is to offer increased pro-
tection for the purchaser."0 "Though proceeding on the basis that
ownership rights should be secure, courts have favored the security of
commercial transactions at least where the owner himself has ex-
hibited carelessness or done other acts which allowed the fraudulent
party to appear as the owner to the good faith buyer.""' In the ins-
tant case Nimncht Chevrolet exhibited carelessness by negligently
leaving keys in the automobile, thus allowing the vehicle to be stolen.
When neither party is guilty of wrongdoing or culpable negligence, as
is the situation in the present case between Allstate Insurance Com-
pany and Mr. Estes, the party invoking subrogation cannot recover
unless its equities are greater than those of its adversary under the
Superior Equities doctrine.
In Allstate Insurance Company v. Estes, a used automobile was
purchased at a used car price from an individual licensed to sell cars.
Under the circumstances the transaction was of such a character that a
purchaser would not ordinarily have reason to suspect an infirmity of
title. Mr. Estes was a good faith purchaser for value in the sense that
he paid a substantial amount of money to a merchant whose business
was such that Mr. Estes, as a customer, would ordinarily have no
reason to suspect any infirmity of title. When one obtains a bill of
sale with the valid signature of a grantor, a certificate of title from the
State of Tennessee, a discharge of a lien by a Mississippi bank on a
Tennessee bank which had a prior lien on the car, and a certificate of
title from the State of Mississippi, it is difficult to imagine what more
a good faith purchaser for value has to do when buying an automobile
in order to obtain good title. And certainly under section 2-403(2) it
was reasonable that Mr. Estes, having been informed that Mr.
Howard was a merchant in the business of selling "goods of that
kind" received good title to the automobile. Mr. Estes cannot be
charged with the business knowledge of the purchasers in Atlas Auto
Rental v. Weisberg 2 and Barry Industries v. Aetna Casualty and
Surety Co.41 In those cases the business experiences of the purchasers
demanded that they should have been put on guard as to the possible
invalidity of the certificates of title they eventually received. In its
latest decision in this area," the Mississippi Supreme Court also
charged the purchaser with similar responsibility.
Mr. Estes was simply an innocent consumer attempting to pur-
"Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.]. 1056
(1954).
4 DUSENBERG AND KING, supra § 10.02(3).
"54 Misc. 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400.
'302 A.2d 61.
"Walker v. Johnson, 354 So. 2d 792.
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chase a car he liked from a man who represented himself as a
Mississippi dealer. The cases show that purchasers like Mr. Estes can
just as innocently buy stolen cars or ones with forged certificates of ti-
tle from established dealers."5
In such a situation the doctrine of Superior Equities mandates that
a jury must consider the equities between the parties and decide which
party had the greater equities, as the jury did in the circuit court when
it found for the appellee, Mr. Estes. For this reason the Mississippi
Supreme Court erred in not upholding the Superior Equities doctrine.
The common law position concerning title was to protect the
equities of ownership. This concept worked well when the market
place was local or regional; but since today's market place is national
in scope, the market demands that the purchaser be protected. In
order to facilitate commercial transactions and to achieve a fair risk
allocation between true owners and bona fide purchasers, the U.C.C.
offers increased protection for the purchaser."
For instance, in Linwood Harvestore, Inc. v. Cannon"' farmers
who purchased silos from an individual whose contract was to
transport the silos were held to be purchasers under U.C.C. section
2-403's entrustment provision." In the first case' 9 of this nature in
this state the court held that a transferor who had paid the balance of
the owner's note conveyed voidable title under section 2-403(2). ° In
the former case the transferor is labeled a thief, whereas in the latter
case the court soften the label with some "twilight zone" semantics.
In either case, the true owner wants what he believes is his property.
This situation becomes even more ridiculous when the attempt is made
to differentiate between the entrustment "thief" and the outright
thief. To say that a voidable title exists where the transferor procures
property through larcenous fraud and, in turn, say that a voidable title
can not exist when the same thief steals the property outright is to
walk a very thin, invisible line.
This line is made even more "invisible" where the auto, as in the
instant case, has apparently gone through several subsequent holders
"See, e.g., 354 So. 2d 792; 375 N.Y.S.2d 545; 302 A.2d 61; 273 A.2d 248.
"The law in the European economic community also renders increased protection
for the good faith purchaser. The French Civil Code art. 2279 as well as German law (§
935) ordinarily protects the bona fide acquirer. Under Italian law the bona fide pur-
chaser will in all cases receive good title, while Portugal and most of the South
American countries offer unrestricted recovery for the bona fide purchaser for value.
See Swartz, The Bona Fide Purchaser Revisited: A Comparative Inquiry, 42 B.U.L.
REV. 403 (1962). Even in England under the common law, a good faith purchaser in the
market overt could obtain good title from a thief. See WILLSTON ON SALES, supra note
11, at § 23-12.
"427 Pa. 434, 235 A.2d 377 (1967).
"Id. at 380.




before it reaches the bona fide purchaser. It would seem that at this
point the purchaser receives a voidable title. In Commercial Credit
Corporation v. Pottmeyer,5 the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged
the wisdom of statutes which provide for protection of a bona fide
purchaser, even when the goods are stolen from the true owner.5 2
Johnny Dell, Inc. v. New York" contains strong dicta to the effect
that even under section 2-403(2) a purchaser who is a dealer in goods
of that kind and who buys from another purchaser who has obtained
the goods from a thief could, as a dealer in the goods, transfer
voidable title to a bona fide purchaser for value.5 ' Also by way of dic-
ta, the Mississippi Supreme Court in its most recent decision in this
area 5 implied that if the purchaser of a stolen auto had acquired a
certificate of title at the time of purchase his claim to being an inno-
cent purchaser for value would have carried more weight.5
Thus there is throughout many of these decisions the uncertainty
of what is encompassed by a voidable transaction. It seems then that
U.C.C. 2-403 has not resolved the controversy. If anything its
language as construed in some of the decisions apparently
foreshadows a continued broadening of the concept.
Certainly the fact that the true owner in the instant case has been
reimbursed for his loss by one whose business is to cover such losses
further strengthens the proposition that the title of the purchaser
should be prima facie evidence of its authority.
Consequently, as the jury fairly surmised, the decision in this case
must turn on which of two innocent parties shall suffer for the fraud
of a third. At this point it is extremely difficult to construe the facts
otherwise. Considering the greater equities displayed by Mr. Estes
and the fact that a transferor who obtains possession of goods from a
true owner by acts which may constitute larcenous fraud or theft
nevertheless has the power to transfer good title to a good faith pur-
chaser for value under U.C.C. section 2-403, it becomes evident that
the supreme court erred in not entitling Mr. Estes to keep possession
of his automobile. U.C.C. section 2-403 protects a good faith pur-
chaser from the inflexible common law rule that a thief cannot pass ti-
tle to stolen goods by extending the rights of a third person who has
innocently bought from a thief. As Professor Gilmore stated:
The only legal certainty is the certainty of legal change. But if we keep
our categories broad and flexible, we can, as lawyers, do a good deal to





"1354 So. 2d 792.
"Id. at 794.
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tegrated into the body of the law as part of an ordered pattern and not
left to come lurching and banging detructively into the vulnerable
framework of a too rigidly conceived structure of doctrine, principles
and rules."
If the law is to respond to the needs of commerce, it must favor the
bona fide purchaser and the doctrine of Superior Equities.
Steven Baker
"Gilmore, supra note 40, at 1121.
